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Every U.S. recession since 1971 has been preceded by two things: an oil price shock and an increase 
in the federal funds rate. Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997,2004) investigated how much oil price 
shocks have contributed to output growth by asking the following counterfactual question: Empirically 
how much would we expect oil price increases to have contributed to output growth if the Fed had 
kept the rate constant instead of letting it increase? They concluded that, at most, half of the observed 
output declines can be attributed to oil price increases. Most were actually caused by funds rate 
increases. A problem with their empirical analysis, however, is that it implicitly assumes that the Fed 
can continually “fool” the public. That is, the funds rate is led constant even though the public actually 
expects the Fed to follow its historical policy rule of raising the funds rate in conjunction with oil price 
increases. We show that if the new policy rule were anticipated oil price increases would have had a 
much larger impact on output than suggested by Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson’s analysis. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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1.  There are, of course, numerous 
studies that analyze the effect of 
monetary shocks and oil shocks 
in isolation. See BGW (1997) for 
references. 
Introduction
Oil price increases have preceded every recession since 1971. Each of these recessions has also been 
preceded by an increase in the federal funds rate (see ﬁ  gure 1). Are recessions caused by the spikes in 
oil prices or a sharp tightening of monetary policy? Perhaps they are caused by a conﬂ  uence of both 
factors, a so-called “perfect storm.” 
In an inﬂ  uential article, Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997), hereafter BGW, tried to answer this 
question. Disentangling the effects of oil and monetary policy on output is extremely difﬁ  cult, and 
BGW’s novel contribution was to quantify the effects of each in a VAR analysis.1 
BGW ﬁ  rst report a baseline case in which these effects are not disentangled and the funds rate 
moves endogenously in response to the oil shock. Output falls sharply in this case. They then disen-
tangle the effects by asking the following counterfactual question: How much would output have 
fallen if the Federal Reserve had kept the funds rate constant in the wake of the oil price shock? Their 
initial answer was surprising to many. If the Fed had kept the funds rate constant, output would have 
fallen only modestly. The endogenous response of monetary policy accounted for virtually all of the 
negative impact of oil shocks on the economy. Because their counterfactual experiment was related 
to previous work by other authors (Sims and Zha 1996), BGW called it the “Sims-Zha” experiment. 
This Policy Discussion Paper examines BGW’s conclusions. We ﬁ  rst identify some problems with 
their empirical analysis, which have been pointed out previously, in particular, insufﬁ  cient lag length 
and the possibility of spurious correlation. But our main focus is on a more serious problem with the 
BGW analysis. In the Sims-Zha experiment, the funds rate is counterfactually held at its pre-oil-shock 
level by adding exogenous unanticipated policy shocks to the funds rate. This is equivalent to an as-
sumption that policy can systematically surprise the public, which is, of course, a highly questionable 
assumption. If the public becomes aware of a systematic movement in policy, the public’s behavior 
FIGURE 1 OIL PRICES AND EFFECTIVE FEDERAL FUNDS RATES
Note: Shaded bars indicate periods of recession.
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” 
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will change in response, so that estimated VAR coefﬁ  cients may not be invariant to systematic changes 
in monetary policy. This is an example of the celebrated “Lucas critique” (1976). 
Since VAR modeling cannot address the quantitative importance of the Lucas critique, we build a 
small-scale, structural, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Within this theoretical model, 
we explicitly perform BGW’s counterfactual experiment under two different assumptions: The funds 
rate behavior is anticipated or it is not. In our “unanticipated” Sims-Zha experiment, the central bank 
keeps the funds rate constant by repeatedly fooling the public. This corresponds exactly to BGW’s em-
pirical analysis. In our “anticipated” Sims-Zha experiment, the public anticipates that the central bank 
will keep the funds rate constant in the wake of the oil price shock. We also perform BGW’s baseline 
case so that we can compare our model’s results more meaningfully with BGW’s.
The results of our model are similar to BGW’s for both the baseline case and the unanticipated Sims-
Zha experiment. However, when we consider the anticipated Sims-Zha experiment, we get a much 
different result. If the public correctly anticipates that the central bank will respond systematically 
to oil price movements in order to keep the funds rate stable, the economy contracts by roughly the 
same amount as in the baseline case. That is, once policy is anticipated, output falls as much as when 
the funds rate is allowed to increase endogenously. The sharp difference between the unanticipated 
and anticipated Sims-Zha experiments implies that expectations are critical, and the Lucas critique 
is quantitatively relevant. Thus, if the Fed had systematically held the funds rate constant after every 
oil shock, output would have declined by an amount comparable to the decline actually observed. In 
other words, the Fed cannot use systematic policy to avert output declines after oil price shocks. 
Oil Price Hikes and Output: Estimation Concerns 
Recall that BGW (1997) concluded that the characteristic decline in output after an oil price shock 
was almost entirely driven by monetary policy and not oil prices per se. According to BGW, if the 
funds rate had been kept constant after the shock, output would not have fallen signiﬁ  cantly. In their 
comment on BGW (1997), Hamilton and Herrera (2004) suggest that BGW’s conclusion is very sen-
sitive to lag length. BGW estimated the impact of oil using monthly data with seven lags. Practically 
speaking, their analysis implicitly assumes that the exogenous impact of an oil price shock on the 
economy ends within seven months. But when Hamilton and Herrera (2004) increase the number of 
monthly lags from seven to twelve months, oil has a signiﬁ  cant impact on the economy—even when 
the funds rate is held constant.
There are two possible explanations for why increasing the number of lags affects BGW’s (1997) 
results so dramatically. One is that it may simply take a year or longer for oil price hikes to fully appear 
in GDP. If this is the case, then extra lag lengths seem warranted. The other explanation is that the ef-
fect is spurious. Introducing extra lags multiplies the number of additional parameters that need to be 
estimated. Estimating all of the extra lags introduces greater imprecision into the estimates, because 
more coefﬁ  cients are being estimated. Hence, although the longer lag length suggests a larger effect 
for oil on the economy, that effect is estimated with greater error, so that one cannot be conﬁ  dent that 
it reﬂ  ects oil’s true effect.
Which lag length to use is an open question. In their response to Hamilton and Herrera, BGW 
(2004) run a quarterly version of their model with four lags. (The results of this experiment are repro-
duced in ﬁ  gure 2.) With the longer lag, the maximum impact of a 10 percent oil price shock with the 
endogenous increase in the funds rate is approximately a 0.7 percent decline in GDP.  This is similar 
to their earlier result with a shorter lag length. But if the funds rate were not allowed to increase FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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FIGURE 2 RESPONSE TO A HAMILTON OIL SHOCK
SAMPLE: 1965:1–1995:4 (4 LAGS, SZ: FED FUNDS SHUT DOWN FOR 4 QUARTERS)
Source: Bernanke, Ben S., Mark Gertler, and Mark Watson, “Oil Shocks and Aggregate 
Macroeconomic Behavior: The Role of Monetary Policy A Reply,” Journal of Money 
Credit and Banking, vol. 36, no. 2, April 2004, 287–91. 
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(their Sims-Zha experiment), the decrease in output would have been muted considerably, falling by 
approximately half of that amount. Speciﬁ  cally, output would have declined approximately 0.4 per-
cent. This stands in contrast to BGW (1997), where they argued that oil would have little independent 
effect on the economy.
It is instructive to put these numbers into context. Oil prices increased more than 50 percent be-
tween January 2004 and October 2004 (from $34 to $53 per barrel). If the funds rate were allowed to 
increase after this 50 percent oil price shock, we would expect output to decline by 3.5 percent! If 
the funds rate were held constant, however, their Sims-Zha experiment suggests that this same shock 
would reduce output by only 2 percent. 
It is also instructive, however, to examine ﬁ  gure 2 more closely. Speciﬁ  cally, in BGW’s (2004) 
baseline experiment, a 10 percent increase in the price of oil increased the funds rate by almost 1.5 
percentage points. Given a 50 percent oil price increase, this implies that the funds rate would have 
increased by nearly 750 basis points. Put another way, their Sims-Zha experiment (keeping the funds 
rate constant) asks what would happen if we were to lower the funds rate by 7.5 percent in conjunc-
tion with the oil price hikes of 2004. Even if you take the baseline funds rate to be 4 percent, as is 
currently suggested by the Taylor rule, this still amounts to lowering the funds rate to –3.5 percent, 
which is clearly nonsensical. 
BGW’s counterfactual Sims-Zha experiment implicitly assumes that the large hikes in the funds 
rate in the mid-1970s and early 1980s were entirely due to oil or the impact of oil on the economy. 
But this assumption is unlikely to be true. The period leading up to the 1975 recession may provide 
us with some guidance as to what the VAR estimates are picking up. 
From the beginning of 1972 to the middle of 1974, the Fed increased the funds rate nearly 10 
percentage points (3.3 percent to 12.9 percent). There was also a huge jump in oil prices during this 
same period—oil prices tripled from $3.56 per barrel in the middle of 1973 to $11.20 at the end of 
1974. But the huge run-up in interest rates was also preceded and likely caused by years of excessively 
easy monetary policy during the late 1960s and early 1970s. This resulted in a nearly 9 percentage 
point jump in actual inﬂ  ation from 1972 to 1974. Inﬂ  ation expectations, while not observable, can 
certainly be expected to have risen as well around this time. These increases, however, were almost 
certainly not entirely due to the oil price shock, which began a little later. The funds rate increase was 
as likely to be caused by the Fed’s earlier accommodation of rising inﬂ  ation expectations as it was oil 
prices. 
When inﬂ  ation expectations rise, the Fed must increase the funds rate by same amount as the 
increase in expected inﬂ  ation just to keep the real funds rate constant. Moving the funds rate from 
1973 to 1975 as inﬂ  ation expectations were increasing meant keeping monetary policy neutral. But 
today, when inﬂ  ation expectations are steady, keeping the funds rate constant would be neutral policy. 
BGW’s VAR estimates cannot shed any light on this hypothesis, as they cannot tease out the contribu-
tion oil makes to policy increases from that made by anything else. If there were shocks to expected 
inﬂ  ation unrelated to the oil price shock, then BGW’s VAR results could be interpreted to say that if 
the Fed were to run an excessively easy and accommodative monetary policy, then output would not 
have declined as much. This suggests that spurious correlation may be driving some of their results 
and that the results of their Sims-Zha experiment are likely to be overestimated. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Oil Prices and Monetary Policy: A CGE Model
A more serious concern with BGW (1997, 2004) is the potential quantitative relevance of the Lucas 
critique. BGW (1997) are clearly cognizant of the critique. They claim, however, that “it seems plausi-
ble to us that a purely transitory deviation from the usual policy rule would not signiﬁ  cantly affect the 
structure of the economy (that is, the quantitative effect of the Lucas critique should be small).” But 
this is just a conjecture on their part. To assess the importance of the critique it is necessary to use a 
model such as the one we develop in this paper. We construct a calibrated computable general equi-
librium model, which can fully account for Lucas critique effects. 
To have a point of reference for comparison, we ﬁ  rst use our model to replicate the two ex-
periments of BGW’s 2004 analysis, the baseline and the Sims-Zha (the unanticipated Sims-Zha in our 
model). For our model’s estimates to be taken seriously,  the results of our baseline and unanticipated 
Sims-Zha experiments should be roughly similar to those generated from BGW’s (2004) VAR data. We 
use BGW’s (2004) quarterly VAR as our empirical benchmark because it is less prone to lag-length 
problems and because our theoretical model is quarterly. In what follows, BGW refers to BGW (2004). 
The appendix presents a brief description of our model and the calibration of its parameters. 
A key issue in the analysis is, of course, the statement of monetary policy. For the baseline simula-
tion, we assume that policy is given by the following Taylor-type rule:
 
Ry tt y t t =+ + τπ τ η ,
where Rt denotes the net nominal interest rate as a deviation from the steady state, πt denotes the 
inﬂ  ation rate as a deviation from the steady state, and yt  denotes output as a log deviation from the 
steady state. The variable ηt  can be interpreted as “policy errors,” which we assume are i.i.d. across 
time. For the baseline experiment ηt = 0. Empirical evidence suggests that, since 1983, the coefﬁ  -
cients in such a monetary policy rule are τ  = 1.53 and  τ y  = 0.27 (Kozicki 2002) . 
In our unanticipated Sims-Zha experiment interest rates are held constant for four quarters or 
equivalently,
 
ητ π τ tt y t yt =− − =  for   to 4. 1
Note the systematic surprises here:  The unanticipated Sims-Zha experiment assumes that households 
anticipate ηt to be white noise when, in fact, it is a function of inﬂ  ation and output. 
In the anticipated Sims-Zha experiment everyone understands that the central bank is going to 
keep the funds rate constant for four quarters by systematically reacting to oil prices. The Taylor rule 
is now given by 
 








t =+ + + + + −−− τπ τ τ τ τ τ 12 1 3 2 4 3
o oil ,
where τ j
oil  (for j = 1 to 4) are chosen so that the impact of an oil shock on interest rates is zero for 
four quarters. More details on the analysis are contained in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004). POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 10, APRIL 2005
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Oil Prices and Monetary Policy: Some Simulations
Figure 3 shows the effect of a 10 percent oil price shock on real GDP. The baseline experiment al-
lows the funds rate to increase as it responds to the systematic part of monetary policy. In contrast 
to BGW’s VAR exercise, where the impact of a 10 percent oil price shock (and the ensuing funds rate 
increase) was a fall in output of around 0.7 percent, we estimate the effect to be approximately 0.45 
percent. Given a 50 percent oil price hike, this amounts to a decline in output of 2.3 percent. The sim-
ple model we build and estimate does not include any of the lags that are obviously important in the 
data. Therefore, this number should not necessarily be thought of as a one-time drop in output growth 
of 2.3 percent. Instead, it may show up as something that lowers output growth on average by some-
thing like 0.6 percent per quarter over the course of a year. Thus, the current oil shock is not likely to 
cause a recession but something more akin to the “soft patch” suggested by Chairman Greenspan.
Figure 3 also illustrates our model’s estimates of BGW’s Sims-Zha experiment (our unanticipated 
Sims-Zha), where the funds rate is held constant. Like BGW, we estimate that the negative impact of oil 
on real GDP is smaller than the baseline case, now 0.2 percent for a 10 percent oil price hike. Figure 3 
also shows, however, a more striking difference between our estimates and BGW’s. In BGW’s baseline 
experiment, the funds rate increases 1.5 percent, but in ours, it increases only 0.5 percent. Recall that 
we argued earlier that BGW’s funds rate responses were probably overestimated. 
In BGW’s (2004) Sims-Zha experiment, monetary policy had to respond (negatively) to oil prices 
directly to keep interest rates from increasing 1.5 percent. Our model implies instead that a 10 per-
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cent oil price shock would push up the nominal rate only 0.5 percent. The impact of such a difference 
on the funds rate that would result after the recent 50 percent oil price increase is especially dramatic. 
BGW’s estimates imply that the nominal rate would rise 750 basis points, so that the Sims-Zha experi-
ment would require an aggressive loosening of policy that is not possible given the recent level of 
the funds rate. In contrast, our model implies a funds rate movement of only 2.5 percent. To put these 
numbers in context, note that the current Taylor rule estimate for the funds rate is around 4 percent, 
so that a 750 basis point decline is nonsensical. 
Our unanticipated Sims-Zha experiment might suggest that a pause in the Fed’s attempt to gradu-
ally increase the funds rate to something that roughly resembles the Taylor rule might be in order. 
Figure 3 suggests that the impact on inﬂ  ation would be small. But before accepting this conclusion, 
we will investigate how sensitive it is to assumptions about expectations and ask whether its validity 
is affected by alternative assumptions.
The Relevance of the Lucas Critique 
While the unanticipated Sims-Zha experiment may help us determine the impact of a one-time de-
viation from a Taylor-type rule, where the Fed responds to oil prices to keep the funds rate constant, 
it is not at all clear that it tells us what would happen if this endogenous response to oil were antici-
pated. Another way to think of this problem is: What would happen to output if the Fed were to re-
spond systematically to oil price increases in such a way as to keep the funds rate constant after an 
oil price shock? 
Our anticipated Sims-Zha experiment addresses this issue by incorporating a systematic monetary 
response to oil into the monetary policy rule, namely, that if oil prices rise, the funds rate should stay 
constant. Because the monetary policy response to oil is systematic, the public would anticipate the 
constant funds rate, and inﬂ  ation expectations would adjust accordingly. 
In sharp contrast to BGW’s assertion that expectations are likely to have a small and insigniﬁ  cant 
effect on their results, ﬁ  gure 3 indicates otherwise. The Lucas critique is quite relevant and quantita-
tively signiﬁ  cant. The unanticipated Sims-Zha experiment had output declining by a small 0.2 percent. 
Once this effect becomes anticipated, however, the effect increases dramatically to –0.48 percent. In 
fact, the response of output to a 10 percent oil price shock is essentially the same as it was in our 
baseline experiment, where interest rates are allowed to increase endogenously in response to the 
increase in oil prices. 
The impact of expectations is clear. In the unanticipated Sims-Zha experiment, when oil prices 
rise, the monetary authority keeps the funds rate constant even though the monetary policy rule calls 
for an increase. The only way to do this in the real world is to take the public by surprise. Keeping 
the funds rate contant when everyone expects it to rise amounts to an unexpected decline in the 
funds rate and is thus expansionary relative to the baseline case. Hence, output falls less than it would 
have otherwise. But once this constant funds rate is anticipated, matters are much different. Output 
responds in the anticipated Sims-Zha experiment in essentially the same way as in the benchmark 
case, where the funds rate increases in response to oil price hikes. These results demonstrate that if 
expectations are not modeled explicitly, it is not possible to disentangle the quantitative effects of oil 
shocks and monetary policy on the economy.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 10, APRIL 2005
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Conclusion and Policy Advice
This paper presents evidence that indicates the likely effect of an oil price shock on output and inﬂ  a-
tion. We do this by modeling two hypothetical relationships between oil and the funds rate—one in 
which the funds rate increases endogenously because of oil’s impact on inﬂ  ation and output, and one 
in which the Fed actively offsets this rate increase by holding the funds rate constant. Furthermore, 
we show the effect of this latter experiment under two different scenarios—one in which the Fed 
engineers the constant fed funds rate by systematically fooling the public (replicating BGW’s Sims-
Zha experiment), and another in which the Fed’s new reaction function is anticipated. By “fooling” the 
public we mean that the public expects the Fed to follow its policy rule, which calls for it to raise the 
funds rate, but instead the Fed keeps the rate constant. Contrary to BGW’s hunch, we show that when 
the new policy rule is anticipated, it makes a large and important difference on output.
The policy implication of this difference is clear. Our simulation of the Sims-Zha experiment sug-
gests that delaying further increases in the funds rate could help the economy through the “soft 
patch” caused by the recent oil price hikes—without increasing the chance of inﬂ  ation. But our antici-
pated Sims-Zha experiment demonstrates the downside of such a choice. The only reason a constant 
fed funds rate would keep output from declining as much as it should after a big spike in oil prices 
is because people don’t expect the Fed to do it. It might work this time, but responding to oil price 
increases in the same way every time will eventually be anticipated by the public and lead to even 
larger output losses. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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The Model
Other than the addition of oil to the production technology, the underlying model is fairly standard. 
See Woodford (2003) and Walsh (2003) for details. In this appendix, we will sketch the framework. 
The theoretical model consists of households and ﬁ  rms. We present the decision problems of each 
in turn. 
Households
Households are inﬁ  nitely lived, discounting the future at rate  β. Their period-by-period utility func-







































denotes real cash balances, which can facilitate time-t transactions. The household begins period t 
with Mt cash balances and Bt-1 one-period nominal bonds that pay Rt-1 gross interest. With wt denoting 
the real wage, Pt the price level, and Xt the time-t monetary injection, the household’s intertemporal 
budget constraint is given by
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Following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), we assume that households are monopolistic 
suppliers of labor and that nominal wages are adjusted as in Calvo (1983). In this case labor supply 
behavior is given by
 
CL Z h W tt tt
σγ= .
It is easy to see that the wage elasticity of labor demand in this model is 1 γ.  The variable  Zht
in this labor demand equation is the monopoly distortion as it measures how far the household’s 
marginal rate of substitution is from the real wage. In the case of perfectly ﬂ  exible but monopolistic 
wages, Zh Zh t =
 
is constant and less than unity. The smaller is Zh, the greater is the monopoly power. 
In the case of sticky nominal wages,  Zht is variable and moves in response to the real and nominal 
shocks hitting the economy. Erceg et al. (2000) demonstrate that in log deviations nominal wage ad-
justment is given by
 
πλ β π t
WW
tt
W zh =+ +1,
    
where πt
W  is time-t net nominal wage growth, and  zht denotes the log deviation from steady-state. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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2.  The implied money supply 
behavior, the Xt (process), is 
passive and can be backed out of 
the ﬁ  rst-order condition for money 
holdings.
Firms
The ﬁ  rms in the model utilize labor services, Lt, from households, and energy, Et, from external sources 
to produce the ﬁ  nal good using the CES technology:
 








The real energy price is equal to  pt
e so that a ﬁ  rm’s nominal proﬁ  ts are given by
 
profits P Y w L p E tt t t t
e
t =− − () .
The ﬁ  rm is a monopolistic producer of these goods, implying that labor will be paid below its 












The variable Zt is the monopoly distortion as it measures how far the ﬁ  rm’s marginal products 
differ from the real factor prices. In the case of perfectly ﬂ  exible but monopolistic prices, Zt = Z is 
constant and less than unity. The smaller is Z, the greater is the monopoly power. In the case of sticky 
prices, Zt is variable and moves in response to the real and nominal shocks hitting the economy. Yun 
(1996) demonstrates that in log deviations nominal price adjustment is given by
 
πλ β π ttt z =+ +1,
where πt  is time-t nominal price growth (as a deviation from steady-state nominal price growth) and 
lower case zt denotes the log deviation from steady-state.
Equilibrium and Policy
There are four markets in this theoretical model: the labor market, the goods market, the bond market, 
and the money market. The respective market-clearing conditions include: CYp E ttt
e
t =− and Bt. 
The money market clears with the household holding the per capita money supply intertemporally.
Unanticipated Sims-Zha Experiment 
BGW’s Sims-Zha experiment corresponds to the following monetary policy rule. In log deviations the 
monetary policy rule is given by a Taylor-type interest rate rule 
 
Ry tt y t t =+ + τπ τ η ,
where yt denotes log deviations in real output. In addition, ηt can be interpreted as “policy errors,” and 
we assume it is i.i.d. across time.2 For the baseline experiment, ηt = 0. In the Sims-Zha experiment in-
terest rates are held constant for 4 quarters or equivalently,
 
ητ π τ tt y t yt =− − =  for   to  14 .
Note the systematic surprises here: The Sims-Zha experiment assumes that households anticipate ηt
to be white noise when, in fact, it is a function of inﬂ  ation and output. POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 10, APRIL 2005
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Anticipated Sims-Zha
In the anticipated Sims-Zha experiment everyone understands that the central bank is going to keep 
the funds rate constant for 4 quarters by systematically reacting to oil prices. The Taylor rule is now 
given by 
 








t =+ + + + + −−− τπ τ τ τ τ τ 12 1 3 2 4 3
o oil ,
where τ j
oil (for j = 1 to 4) are chosen so that the impact of an oil shock on interest rates is zero for 
4 quarters.
Calibration
Before proceeding with the analysis, we need to set parameter values at levels consistent with em-
pirical estimates for a quarterly model. Preference parameters are given by  β  = 0.99 (implying a 4 
percent annual steady-state real rate of return), σ  = 2, and γ  = 3. The latter values are consistent with 
micro evidence of fairly inelastic savings and labor supply behavior. Since monetary policy is given by 
an interest-rate-targeting procedure, the nature of the utility of money is irrelevant. Finally, we assume 
that prices and nominal wage levels can be adjusted on average every 2.9 quarters. Given the other 
preference parameters, this implies λ = 0.19 and λ
w  = 0.0146.
As for ﬁ  rms, the elasticity of substitution between oil and labor is equal to 1/ρ . Consistent with 
empirical estimates, we set this elasticity to 0.59, or ρ  = 1.7 (Kim and Loungani (1992). The share 
parameter a is set to 0.02. This implies a share of energy in total output of 6 percent (consistent with 
its share in 1989). 
The (logged) real price of oil is given by an exogenous AR(2) process
 






t =++ −− 11 22 ε .
Estimating this process yields a1 = 1.12 and a2  = –0.15. 
Finally, recall that monetary policy in the baseline experiment is given by
 
Ry tt y t =+ τπ τ .
Empirical evidence presented in Kozicki (2002) suggests that since 1983 the coefﬁ  cients in this 
monetary policy rule are τ  = 1.53 and τ y = 0.27. papers
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